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Psychologists have long debated the extent to which people transfer knowledge from 
context to context. This debate has emerged in the study of literacy where researchers of 
composition and literary understanding have begun to examine the extent to which 
different tasks require particular knowledge and the extent to which different interpre-
tive communities require specific understandings. This article reviews issues related to 
transfer and knowledge specificity as articulated in psychology and then examines 
theory and research in composition and literary understanding which parallel the 
debate in psychology. The authors identify three positions that have emerged in literacy 
debates: the case for general knowledge, the case for task-specific knowledge, and the 
case for community-specific knowledge. Each position carries with it certain assump-
tions about learning and transfer, and each has clear implications for curriculum and 
instruction. The authors delineate the positions and the assumptions that drive them 
and detail their instructional consequences, arguing that researchers and teachers need 
an articulated understanding of their assumptions about knowledge and transfer in 
order to establish a clear and coherent relationship between theory and practice. 
Whenever teachers instruct, they implicitly convey their beliefs about knowledge 
transfer. Teachers assume not only a certain knowledge base on the part of students 
but also an ability on the students' part to bring that knowledge to bear on new 
instructional situations. Furthermore, teachers make assumptions about the knowl-
edge that students will transfer from new instruction to future learning experiences: 
They will learn from writing one composition how to write well on subsequent essays, 
they will learn from reading Gulliver's Travels how to understand other satires, and so 
on. 
The questions that researchers of literacy investigate often concern knowledge 
transfer. Inquiries into language and literacy acquisition have investigated ways in 
which learners draw on prior knowledge as they read and write and, often, seek 
connections between the processes underlying the two (e.g., Irwin & Doyle, 1992). 
The purpose of this article is to review the issue of knowledge transfer as it has been 
discussed generally in the literature of educational psychology and then to examine 
three positions relative to knowledge transfer that have emerged in studies of literacy 
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in the areas of composition and literary understanding: the case for general knowl-
edge, the case for task-specific knowledge, and the case for community-specific 
knowledge. By situating themselves in reference to these positions, researchers and 
teachers can better articulate the principles that motivate their theory and practice. 
The Debate in Educational Psychology 
The debate about issues surrounding critical thinking illustrates the problems 
faced by theorists and researchers in composition and literary understanding. 
Among the most thorny and rancorously contended problems in critical thinking 
discussions is the extent to which learners can transfer general knowledge to particu-
lar situations. A recent exchange between Ennis (1989, 1990) and McPeck (1990) 
illustrates a central contention in the dispute. The arguments of each are complex and 
have occupied many years of their careers, but they might be summarized as follows: 
"[It] makes sense to talk about significant general critical thinking abilities and 
dispositions, that at least some are not trivially obvious, and that applying an 
ability in a variety of domains makes it a general ability" (Ennis, 1990, p. 16). In 
contrast, "[There] are almost as many different kinds of critical thinking as there 
are different kinds of things to think about. The criteria for applying and assessing 
critical thinking derive from the thing . . . discussed or thought about at the time" 
(McPeck, 1990, p. 10). 
Their disagreement centers around some of the more vexing problems facing 
educational theorists and practitioners: To what extent is knowledge specific to 
particular situations? To what extent can learners transfer knowledge from one 
context to another? Can people learn general skills that help them to solve problems 
in a variety of fields? Do people exercise a "mental muscle" when they attempt to 
solve particular problems? These questions have motivated the debate over the value 
and appropriateness of school courses in subjects such as critical thinking, ethics, 
study skills, values clarification, composition, reading, and statistics, all of which 
purport to teach general abilities that one can transfer to a variety of domains. No 
conclusive evidence has emerged to validate or discredit any single perspective on 
the problem of how effectively people transfer general knowledge to particular 
situations. 
Perkins and Salomon (1989) have provided an insightful analysis of the issue of 
general and specific knowledge as debated by psychologists. They illustrate the 
problem with the hypothetical example of whether or not a chess master would make 
a capable military leader. (Interestingly enough, we see a similar occupational 
transfer in common practice: the retired military general hired as a business executive 
or its educational corollary, the high school football coach who becomes an adminis-
trator.) Those who support the position of the transfer of general thinking skills 
would argue that certain strategic principles, such as controlling the center of the 
arena, should carry over from chess to war. Those arguing in favor of specific 
knowledge might counter that wars should be fought by soldiers who know the 
intricacies of the enterprise: General Custer learned all too well that control of the 
center of the conflict is a highly context-specific strategy. 
Psychologists have come up with different answers to the question of the extent to 
which general knowledge is sufficient to solve particular problems. Poly a (1954, 
1957), for instance, identified a set of heuristics, such as breaking a problem into 
subproblems and using diagrams to represent a problem in different ways, as part of a 
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repertoire of general problem-solving skills in math. Others have since questioned 
the strength of the broad applicability of these methods, concluding, as the debate is 
outlined by Perkins and Salomon (1989), that "the more general the method, the 
weaker the method" (p. 19). The conflict between the general and specific knowledge 
positions raises questions about how learners fare when employing their knowledge 
in new situations. In the afterglow of Operation Desert Storm, for instance, General 
Norman Schwartzkopf was reported to be a candidate for the chancellorship of at 
least one large state university—presumably due to his intelligence, foresight, orga-
nization, and leadership abilities. Those who questioned the wisdom of his appoint-
ment might have pointed to contextual factors such as faculty activism, student 
activism, lack of a clear chain of command, and so on which might weaken the 
leadership skills that a military officer relies on for authority. 
Theorists and researchers in both composition and literary understanding have 
begun to debate issues similar to those argued by general learning theorists. Some 
scholars have argued that students should acquire general knowledge about writing 
and literary understanding that enables proficiency in all contexts. Others maintain 
that different types of tasks (i.e., writing an argument or interpreting ironic litera-
ture) require specialized knowledge that is not necessarily applicable to other types 
of tasks. A final group contends that even particular types of tasks require specific 
knowledge depending on the context of their application; Colomb (1988) calls these 
specialized areas communities, "with all the ideological, economic, political, mate-
rial, linguistic, moral, and other determinants of communal life" (pp. 2-3). Suc-
cessful performance within each community, he argues, requires particular 
knowledge "at every level of text structure, from syntax through global discourse 
structure" (p. 3). 
Before we explore these positions, we should explain what we mean by knowledge. 
Often, knowledge is assumed to be, in the words of Dickens's Mr. McChoakumchild, 
"Fact, fact, fact!" We use the term here as it has been used in cognitive psychology to 
encompass the what, how, and when of learning. Knowledge in our conception 
includes: 
1. Knowledge of content, which is not merely one's factual knowledge of informa-
tion of the sort found in Hirsch's (1987) Cultural Literacy but is also knowledge of 
one's own personal experiences, of the implications of an approaching thunderhead, 
of the functions of the various buttons on one's computer keyboard, and so on—that 
is, knowledge that one can name. 
2. Knowledge of form, which is the knowledge that enables one to distinguish one 
thing from another according to their features—such as, knowing how to distinguish 
an alligator from a crocodile, cool jazz from bebop, and so on. 
Each of these two types of knowledge can include declarative and procedural 
knowledge. Declarative knowledge concerns what; one either does or does not know 
who the 14th president was, how an in medias res story structure begins, and so on. 
Procedural knowledge concerns how; one might be able to identify an in medias res 
opening in The Odyssey, but one does not know how to begin such a story oneself. 
(See Hillocks, 1986b, for an elaboration of this perspective on knowledge.) 
3. Conditional knowledge (e.g., Paris, Lipson & Wixson, 1983), which is the 
knowledge of when to apply knowledge of content or form. One might know how to 
exaggerate for a humorous effect, for instance, but conditional knowledge should 
inform one not to exaggerate when reporting research results. (See Alexander, 
Schallert, & Hare, 1991, for a comprehensive review of knowledge terminology.) 
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Our discussion of the nature of knowledge, then, considers the types of knowledge 
typically identified in debates about learning. At this point, we will outline the 
positions taken by theorists of composition and literary understanding regarding the 
necessity and sufficiency of general, task-specific, and community-specific knowl-
edge. Three points before we begin: First, we are focusing on a specific kind of 
composing—the production of extended written discourse of the sort typically writ-
ten and read in schools and in professional life—and a specific kind of reading—the 
reading of imaginative literature. Second, our discussion of knowledge does not 
include a discussion of grammatical knowledge because both readers and writers 
unquestionably transfer such basic knowledge from situation to situation. (See 
Hillocks & Smith, 1991, for a discussion of instructional issues related to grammar.) 
Third, we are attempting to clarify and to illustrate the three positions we have 
identified, rather than to provide a comprehensive survey of literacy research in-
formed by these positions. We have thus circumscribed the issues in order to make 
them manageable within the limitations of a single essay. 
Composition 
The Argument for General Knowledge 
The assumption that general knowledge is sufficient for most composing needs has 
driven practice for many years. The primary instructional tool involving general 
composing knowledge has been the general expository model as outlined in books 
such as Warriner and Griffith's (1977) English Grammar and Composition: Complete 
Course, which Applebee (1986) describes as "the most widely used composition text 
today" (p. 95). This Heritage edition of Warriner and Griffith's, for instance, 
informed the secondary student that. 
Most of the writing you are required to do in school—tests, reports, essays—is 
expository, and most of the writing you will do after you leave school will be of this 
kind. 
No matter what you are writing about, the basic steps involved in writing are 
almost always the same. They should become so familiar that you will follow them 
habitually whenever you write, (p. 339) 
The steps outlined by the text include selecting and limiting a topic, assembling 
materials, organizing and outlining ideas, writing a draft that follows a particular 
form (usually including five paragraphs), revising, and preparing a final draft. 
Many might arch a skeptical eyebrow concerning the clairvoyance of Warriner and 
Griffith regarding the type of writing most people will produce both in and, partic-
ularly, beyond school. Although a staple of instructional practice for many years, the 
five-paragraph theme has fallen into disrepute among academics. The most scathing 
criticism comes from Emig (1971) in her famous fifty-star theme derogation in which 
she calls it an "essentially redundant form, devoid, or duplicating, of content in at 
least two of its five parts . . . the assumption [being] that freshman English is a 
monolith, rather than a hydra-headed monster . . . " (pp. 97-98). Emig was con-
cerned that the form itself was incommodious to the many and various needs of 
writers and that the instructional emphasis was on product instead of process. 
A final problem, and the one that we focus on in the present exposition, concerns 
the assumption about the extent to which people can transfer general knowledge, 
whether of product or of process, to novel situations. Warriner and Griffith's (1977) 
text and similar texts instructed for many years from the premise that one composi-
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tion is much like the next and that knowledge of a general text form will enable 
students to reproduce the single essential text structure successfully and abundantly. 
This assumption about the widespread applicability of the five-paragraph theme 
structure still influences many secondary teachers of our acquaintance who practice it 
both by choice and by department and school board mandate. 
The assumption about the widespread applicability of general composing knowl-
edge related to essay form affects current practice in other ways as well. "Style 
checker" computer programs, for instance, are produced by a number of companies, 
including the venerable Modern Language Association, suggesting the existence of 
both a strong market and an authoratative belief in the power of general knowledge. 
Such programs are designed to suggest areas of improvement for any composition 
submitted to them; they flag what they perceive as problems regardless of the 
rhetorical demands of particular pieces. These programs, in spite of their popularity, 
are routinely criticized for their assumptions about the general nature of composing 
knowledge. When evaluating the Gettysburg Address, for instance, they offer the 
predictably comical suggestion that the author should be more concise, subverting 
the unique rhetorical demands of Lincoln's oratory to the general prescription that 
writers should avoid being wordy. 
Faith in the sufficiency of general knowledge of text structure is rare among the 
professoriate and has been replaced by a belief in general procedural knowledge that 
has begun to transform teaching and textbooks. One instructional tool for imparting 
general composing procedures is the heuristic, which is a general probe, usually in 
the form of a question, that points the writer towards some aspect of composing. 
Several researchers and theorists have investigated the use of heuristics as a general 
tool for improving writing. Larson (1968), for instance, proposed a plan for teaching 
rhetorical invention through the development of an extensive set of questions that 
writers might apply to their compositions. In the area of "Writing about Proposi-
tions" (p. 133), for example, he identified such questions as "What must be estab-
lished for the reader before he will believe it?" and "To what line of reasoning is it 
apparently a conclusion?" (p. 133). Similarly, Odell (1976) has developed a set of 
general questions—such as, "contrast" (p. 80) questions: "In what ways is ^differ-
ent from other things I know?" (p. 80). The sorts of heuristics developed by Larson 
and Odell have been studied by several researchers (Burns, 1980; Dutch, 1980; 
Ebbert, 1980; Lamberg, 1974; Odell, 1974; Young & Koen, 1973) who have achieved 
mixed results regarding their effectiveness in improving writing, with the results 
often called into question by the studies' dubious means of control (i.e., confounding 
variables in the treatment design). Hillocks (1986a) nonetheless finds their promise 
"encouraging" (p. 180) and suggests that they be investigated further. 
Despite their potential, heuristics have been supplanted in popularity by general 
procedures for producing texts that rely on nonlinear thinking such as brainstorming, 
clustering, and free writing. Among the foremost advocates of these nonlinear 
procedures has been Murray (1980, 1987), who refers to "the process approach to 
writing" (1987, p. 6) as consisting of five steps: collecting, focusing, ordering, 
developing, and clarifying. Writers can apply this general process to any composing 
problem and couple the five steps with general strategies such as free writing, 
brainstorming, and mapping. "Freewriting," maintains Murray, "is just as valuable a 
technique to use as a starting point for a term paper, a historical essay, or a review of 
scientific literature" (1987, p. 42). Free writing, he argues, is a fundamental tool for 
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unearthing that which one has to express: It "makes writing easier by helping you 
with the root psychological or existential difficulty in writing: finding words in your 
head and putting them down on a blank piece of paper" (p. 14). 
The most passionate proponent of general procedures undoubtedly has been 
Elbow (1973, 1981), who has written extensively and with considerable influence 
about the seemingly endless benefits of free writing. He describes two general writing 
procedures. One is the direct writing process, which he recommends "for tasks like 
memos, reports, somewhat difficult letters, or essays where I don't want to engage in 
much new thinking" (1981, p. 26). The direct writing process "is very simple. Just 
divide your available time in half. The first half is for fast writing without worrying 
about organization, language, correctness or precision. The second half is for revi-
sion" (p. 26). 
The second process is the loop writing process: 
For the first half, the voyage out, you do pieces of almost-freewriting during which 
you allow yourself to curve out into space—allow yourself, that is, to ignore or even 
forget exactly what your topic is. For the second half, the voyage home, you bend your 
efforts back into the gravitational field of your original topic as you select, organize 
and revise parts of what you produced during the voyage out. (p. 60) 
He gives several quite disparate examples of possible applications of the loop 
process: a comparison/contrast of Freud and Jung, an analysis of the causes of the 
French Revolution, a report on levels of pollution of various chemicals in Puget 
Sound, an analysis of government expenditures for various kinds of armaments and 
defense, and a paper on abortion. 
The assumption behind this conception of composing knowledge is that writing 
consists of a very few simple procedures that one develops and uses effectively 
through practice. "The voyage out" is serviceable regardless of particular naviga-
tional problems of the myriad tasks one endeavors or of the gravitational fields one 
enters; it will guide explorers through meteor showers, black holes, intense solar 
heat, and Klingon attacks with equal dexterity. The position holds that, while one 
might need particular content knowledge to write about Freud or the French Revolu-
tion, one's process in executing the tasks or approaching the topics needn't vary. 
Murray's (1987) and Elbow's (1973) advocacy of free writing is largely impres-
sionistic. Several experimental studies have investigated the method's effects on 
improving writing. Alloway, Carrol, Emig, King, Marcotrigiano, Smith, and Spicer 
(1979); Cummings (1981); Hilgers (1980); Olson and DiStefano (1976); and Wagner, 
Zemelman, and Malone-Trout (1981) achieved significant gains through treatments 
involving free writing, yet a great number of studies has found no significant improve-
ment between treatments involving free writing and control treatments (Adams, 
1971; Arthur, 1981; Baden, 1974; Davis, 1979; Delaney, 1980; Dreussi, 1976; Fox, 
.1980; Ganong, 1975; Gauntlett, 1978; Norwood, 1974; Reynolds, 1981; Walker, 
1974; Witte & Faigley, 1981). The body of experimental research may be question-
able for a number of reasons. Newkirk (1987) points out that the bulk of the studies 
has not been published in refereed journals, suggesting a general lack of rigor. 
Hillocks (1986a) identifies flaws in the design of some studies, such as a lack of 
pretests. He also points out that researchers have constructed varying definitions of 
free writing in the design of the different studies, thus making the procedure and its 
effects difficult to pinpoint. Furthermore, at times, treatments in the control groups 
were not explicated; at other times, they were identified only as traditional instruc-
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tion—presumably, grammar instruction, the study of model essays, and so on— 
resulting in the sort of apples and oranges comparisons that are of little value. Thus, 
the experimental research on the effectiveness of general procedures, such as free 
writing, is inconclusive. 
Perhaps the most widely embraced body of research supporting general composing 
procedures has come from Graves (1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1980,1981a, 1981b, 1983) 
and his associates (Calkins, 1979,1980a, 1980b, 1981; Kamler, 1980; Sowers, 1979; 
for a critical analysis, see Barrs, 1983; Hillocks, 1984, 1986a, 1986b; Smagorinsky, 
1987). Graves, concerned that experimental research is "boring" (1979b, p. 76) and 
"smells of musty bookcases and crusty language" (p. 76), chose instead a case study 
method of examining Piagetian stages of writing development among elementary 
school children. Maintaining that "Research in education is not a science" (1979a, 
p. 917), he chose a more ethnographic approach that he believed would better 
examine the processes engaged in by writers and that would not simply rely on 
written products to illuminate the complexity of the writing process. Graves found 
that elementary school students could learn general procedures for topic selection 
(optimally focusing on personal experiences), text generation (i.e., writing a series of 
leads or possible opening lines), and unconstrained drafting of texts that follow many 
of the same principles of process advocated by Murray (1987) and Elbow (1973). 
Even though the studies by Graves have been criticized for their lack of internal 
consistency (i.e., they purport to be investigating developmental stages, yet student 
behavior is influenced deliberately by teacher interventions; Smagorinsky, 1987), 
they remain the most widely cited research base to support the benefits of general 
procedural composing knowledge. 
The general knowledge position, then, has focused on both form and procedures, 
with the focuses greatly at odds. Murray, for instance, has offered the searing opinion 
that "The process of making meaning with written language cannot be understood by 
looking backward from a printed page. Process cannot be inferred from product any 
more than a pig can be inferred from a sausage" (1980, p.3). Yet the two focuses do 
share a common assumption that general knowledge is sufficient and that writers can 
transfer it spontaneously from situation to situation with relative ease. Murray 
maintains that the process approach to writing "can be adapted by our students to 
whatever writing tasks face them—the memo, the poem, the textbook, the speech, 
the consumer complaint, the job application, the story, the essay, the personal letter, 
the movie script, the accident report, the novel, the scientific paper" (1980, p. 20). 
While Murray has broadened the range of forms through which people express 
themselves from expository to other types of writing and has shifted the instructional 
emphasis from product to process, he asserts that knowledge of how to produce all 
types of compositions springs from the same source and applies broadly to them all. 
For teachers, then, composition instruction emanating from the general knowl-
edge position is concerned with providing students with a set of forms and/or 
procedures that will presumably serve them well as they move from topic to topic and 
from class to class. Those advocating a procedural emphasis tend to focus on methods 
for topic discovery, with the particular demands of different writing tasks seeming to 
fall into place as the composition unfolds, as, in Murray's words, "writing finds its 
own meaning" (1980, p. 20). This faith in general procedural knowledge is shared 
now by Warriner's English Composition and Grammar: Fifth Course, which in the 
1988 version includes sections on general topic-finding procedures—such as, keeping 
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a journal, brainstorming, clustering, and asking the five what-how questions—and 
advises students to "Be sure to go through each stage in the writing process: 
prewriting, writing a first draft, evaluating, revising, proofreading, and writing a final 
version" (p. 32). Through engagement in these procedures, the text assumes, stu-
dents will be able to perform well regardless of the tasks and contexts in which they 
apply them. 
The Argument for Task-Specific Knowledge 
The view of writing as a general, all-purpose process is endorsed widely (Apple-
bee, 1986). Yet, like the theory of general heuristics forwarded by Polya and others, 
the notion of general, transferable writing knowledge has come under question. The 
second position that we will review holds that composing knowledge is particular to 
different types of tasks and that, contrary to the notion that a general expository 
model or general set of procedures is sufficient, different types of tasks require 
different types of knowledge. Like the general knowledge position, the task-specific 
knowledge position is divided by the issue of whether the knowledge should concern 
form or procedures. 
The argument for task-specific knowledge related to form is simply one that 
broadens the position originally taken by Warriner and Griffith (1977). Rather than 
holding that most people engage primarily in exposition, this position identifies a set 
of writing forms that people can learn and use whenever engaging in related types of 
tasks. This position has ancient roots that date back to the Greek academies of 
antiquity in which students memorized the orations of their masters. Today's version 
of this approach appears in the modern endorsement of the four classical forms of 
discourse: exposition, argumentation, description, and narration. Instruction in 
these forms presumes that each has a distinct set of traits that can be best learned by 
reading exemplary models, analyzing their characteristic elements, and then repro-
ducing them in independent essays (Eschholz, 1980). The four classical forms often 
are expanded to include a variety of different text structures including the business 
letter, the film review, the comparison/contrast essay, the Shakespearean sonnet, and 
many others. Typically, however, the instructional approach is product centered, 
with students studying and imitating exemplary models. 
The modern emphasis on process has resulted in dissatisfaction with product-
related instruction in task or form, and several theorists have suggested a procedural 
alternative to implementing task-related instruction. Chief among them have been 
Hillocks (1975, 1982, 1984, 1986a, 1986b, 1987) and his students and colleagues 
(Hillocks, Kahn, & Johannessen, 1983; Hillocks, McCabe, & McCampbell, 1971; 
Johannessen, Kahn, & Walter, 1982; Kahn, Walter, & Johannessen, 1984; McCann, 
1989; Smagorinsky, 1986,1989,1991a, 1991b, 1992; Smagorinsky & Gevinson, 1989; 
Smagorinsky, McCann, & Kern, 1987; Smith, 1984; see also Applebee, 1986; Teich, 
1987). Much of Hillocks's work has concerned instruction in essays that involve 
definition, a type of writing which, he argues, requires knowledge of procedures that 
are appropriate to the definition task but that are not necessarily helpful in producing 
writing with different task demands. Hillocks et al. (1983) describe certain "enabling 
strategies" (p. 276) for compositions involving the definition of abstract concepts: 
"1) to circumscribe the problem generally, 2) to compare examples in order to 
generate criteria which discriminate between the target concept and related but 
essentially different concepts, and 3) to generate examples which clarify the distinc-
tions" (p. 276). 
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These strategies are unique to the definition task; one would not employ them in 
analyzing the causes of the French Revolution. A teacher, these theorists argue, 
should not teach a few all-purpose strategies that enable writers to produce a 
definition, a business memo, and a short story; a teacher should conduct a task 
analysis (Hillocks et al., 1971; Johannessen et al., 1982) to identify the skills needed 
for successful performance in a particular writing task and to design activities that 
teach students the appropriate set of strategies. Hillocks concludes from his meta-
analysis of exemplary experimental composition studies conducted from 1963-1983 
(1984, 1986a, 1987) that an instructional focus that teaches writers task-specific 
composing procedures is the most effective of the focuses contrasted. Hillocks has 
labeled treatments that involve students in the inductive analysis of concrete mate-
rials in order to develop task-specific strategies an inquiry focus. He has argued 
strongly—too strongly, some feel (i.e., Durst, 1987; Newkirk, 1987)—that such 
instruction should supercede other approaches, particularly those that proceed from 
assumptions concerning the efficacy of general procedural knowledge. 
Hillocks had argued previously (1982), in a manner similar to Murray's (1987), that 
writers in divergent disciplines engaged in scientific inquiry share certain basic 
strategies: "observing, describing, generalizing, comparing and contrasting (defin-
ing), hypothesizing, and testing generalizations" (p. 664). However, whereas Murray 
argues that knowledge of these skills is sufficient to guide all writing, Hillocks has 
contended that the complexity and demands of particular tasks require more spe-
cialized knowledge. Hillocks (1986b) has described writing tasks that involve proc-
esses quite different from the scientific process of inquiry. Writing a fable, for 
instance, requires writers to develop strategies for producing personification, narra-
tion, exaggeration, and so on suggesting that the two types of tasks involve quite 
different declarative and procedural knowledge of content and form. All of these 
tasks might indeed involve a voyage out and a voyage in, but the task-specific 
knowledge position asserts that the astute composer/pilot will board appropriate 
vehicles and employ particular procedures for negotiating the unique atmospheres 
and obstacles encountered in these vastly different environments. 
Applebee (1986) argues that composition knowledge is task-specific, although he 
disagrees with some of Hillocks's distinctions between instructional modes and 
focuses. He argues that process approaches to teaching, although a preferable 
alternative to the prescriptive, product-centered methods of texts such as the older 
versions of English Grammar and Composition, have been badly underconcep-
tualized, have been inadequate, and have been "embraced simplistically and na-
ively" (p. 97). Applebee finds the reduction of process instruction to simple formulas 
regarding general stages of writing to be insufficient and misguided. He argues that, 
among the writers he has studied, "The choice of appropriate strategies was driven by 
the task at hand—not by a generalized conception of the 'writing process' that the 
writers used in all contexts" (p. 102). He continues, 
Process activities are not appropriate for all writing tasks . . . and even when such 
activities are needed, different tasks will pose different problems and require in turn 
somewhat different writing processes. Some tasks require much planning and orga-
nizing before the writer can begin; some require careful editing before being shared 
with a critical audience; some involve sharing of familiar experiences within well-
learned formats and require no further process supports at all. Indeed, the universe 
of writing tasks, both in and out of school, is large and diverse. Essay exams require 
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one set of approaches, research papers another. The journalist dictating a late-
breaking story over the telephone writes in one way, the short story writer in another. 
In part because studies of writing processes have ignored this diversity, process-
oriented instruction easily degenerates into an inappropriate and lockstep formula. If 
instruction is not conceptualized to make the link between process and product 
explicit and real, the approach is easily trivialized. Rather than suggesting a range of 
strategies for solving problems, process instruction will become just another series of 
practice exercises. 
The task-specific knowledge position, then, argues for differentiated instruction, 
dependent on the particular demands of individual tasks. Advocates of this position 
would dispute Murray's (1980) notion that a writer can approach a poem and a memo 
in the same way and with the same procedures. Indeed, those who endorse this 
position would undoubtedly argue that even different types of poems—a sonnet, a 
free verse poem, a limerick, or virtually any other poetic type—would require unique 
knowledge, with each variation (i.e., different types of sonnets) requiring yet more 
specialized knowledge. Pedagogy based on the assumption that composing knowl-
edge is task-specific requires an analysis of the particular knowledge required for 
each type of composition and explicit instruction in the appropriate set of procedures. 
The Argument for Community-Specific Knowledge 
The task-specific knowledge position asserts that particular tasks require particu-
lar types of knowledge. A third position holds that, even if one accepts the need for 
task-related knowledge, writers in different communities produce texts of similar 
structure in quite different ways because of the demands and customs of the particu-
lar communities in which they participate. Pauline Kael (1985) and Antonin Scalia 
(cited in Denniston, 1989), for instance, both write texts that rely on the generation of 
definitions. They produce them, however, for vastly different purposes and in de-
cidedly different environments. 
Film critic Pauline Kael's credibility depends on her ability to evaluate films 
according to a consistent set of standards, and hence she needs to convey in her 
reviews her definition of what constitutes quality in film. In her review of Roland 
Joffe's The Killing Fields, for instance, she offers the following: 
Some of the episodes covering Pran's four years of slavery and escape attempts and 
beatings and his being tied to a tree and left for dead are [phonied up]; there are 
fictional episodes in which Pran, entrusted with the child of a disaffected Khmer 
Rouge official, tenderly carries the little boy in his arms over dangerous mountain 
passes, and the glossy piousness affects even the cinematography—it becomes 
blandly pictorial. . . . Yet the power of the images of urban death squads and the 
mass exodus from Phnom Penh stays with you. The great scenes are so impressive 
that the weak ones don't cancel out your emotions. (1985, p. 277) 
A quality film, she implies, does not manipulate the action to develop characters 
and relationships or to toy with the viewer's emotions; she makes similar criticisms of 
Terms of Endearment and Penny Serenade for their bogus and calculated plot twists 
(p. 97). Good films, rather, portray the full emotional expressiveness of the charac-
ters through convincing action, leading the audience to a release of honest feelings. 
Through her establishment of her evaluative criteria and her consistent adherence to 
them, Kael has established herself as a credible judge of film. 
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Antonin Scalia's arena, on the other hand, has been the court room, where he 
works to establish legal criteria for judging human behavior. In the following tran-
script, he is participating in the deliberations over whether or not the Supreme Court 
should judge the infamous Texas v. Johnson flag burning case. In questioning the 
prosecuting lawyer (Drew), Scalia and his fellow justices proceed as follows: 
Stevens: You have not made an argument that there's anything unique about the flag. 
Drew: Well, Your Honor, I disagree. The flag is the visible manifestation of over 200 
years of history in this nation. The thirteen stripes represent the original thirteen 
colonies, and every state is represented on the field of blue by a star. It is unique. It is 
immediately recognizable to almost anyone who sees it. 
Marshall: Suppose somebody burns an American flag with forty-eight stars. 
Drew: I believe that that would be covered under this statute. That is clearly a past 
flag. Many people probably still own and display forty-eight star flags. 
Scalia: But forty-seven wouldn't work because there was never a forty-seven star flag. 
Drew: That would depend, Your Honor. 
Scalia: All you have to do is take one star out of the flag and it's okay? 
Drew: That would depend, Your Honor, on how flag is defined. Congress itself 
defines the flag: "The Stars and Stripes in any number which to an individual who 
looks at it without deliberation may be a flag." The flag behind you looks to me to be 
a flag, but I cannot count fifty stars on it. 
Scalia: So you're saying forty-seven would be okay. I tend to think that's probably 
right. (Cited in Denniston, 1989, pp. 42-44) 
Like Kael, Scalia engages in the same processes described by Hillocks et al. (1983) 
of circumscribing the problem generally and generating examples that discriminate 
between the target concept and closely related concepts. His ability to generate fine 
gradations in a series of examples is instrumental in defining what constitutes a flag; 
indeed, he and the other justices spend the bulk of the session generating problematic 
examples to come to agreement on the definitions of the key concepts of flag and 
desecration. Although he is not writing at this juncture of the hearings, he is 
undoubtedly engaging in a collaborative form of composing that will help shape the 
ultimate written decision of the court. His oral discourse here is much like the oral 
discourse of the students engaged in prewriting activities of the sort described by 
Hillocks et al. (1983). 
The question is: Are Kael and Scalia involved in the same activity? Without a 
doubt, both are involved in the task-specific defining skills of generating criteria 
through the careful consideration of problematic examples. But would Pauline Kael 
make a good Supreme Court justice? And could Antonin Scalia manage a career as a 
film critic? In other words, even given the acquisition and mastery of the fundamental 
skills of the defining task, do they require further knowledge for particular applica-
tions of the procedures? 
To consider these questions, we turn to different applications of what is generally 
known as argumentation. According to Toulmin (1958), all arguments include claims, 
data, warrants, propositions, qualifications, and rebuttals. Yet the form these ele-
ments take depends on the context in which one argues, both in terms of the 
conventions one follows and in terms of the particular declarative knowledge needed 
to persuade experts in the field to accept one's perspective. Most people would agree 
that declarative knowledge is essential to effective argumentation; Pauline Kael 
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could not become a Supreme Court justice because she lacks an encyclopedic 
knowledge of legal precedent. Recent research has looked beyond declarative and 
procedural knowledge and investigated the importance of discourse conventions. An 
examination of argumentation as employed in two quite different fields, literary 
criticism and legal brief writing, will illustrate the different values that different 
communities place on particular argumentative traits. 
Fahnestock and Secor (1991) have argued that literary criticism is a unique form of 
discourse, one which a purist might find deficient in terms of its implementation of 
argumentative structure: 
Though literary arguments may seem flawed when viewed from a distance and by a 
field-independent standard, they can still be compelling to the audiences for whom 
they were intended. To identify the sources of their appeal, we must remember that 
these arguments exist in a particular field, a unique rhetorical situation; they are acts 
of communication directed at a special audience in a particular kind of forum, and as 
such they have their own characteristic procedures. Just as political oratory, pulpit 
homilies, and even advertising copy exploit a limited set of rhetorical possibilities, so 
also does literary criticism employ a definable repertoire of persuasive tactics to 
achieve communication in its well-defined environment, (p. 84) 
A literary critic's effectiveness "depends not just on what is said but on the vehicle 
of its saying" (Fahnestock & Secor, 1991, p. 91), with the metaphor serving as "the 
very vehicle by which the argument is framed in language" (p. 92). Literary argument 
also relies on the invocation of special topoi, including the use of paradox, which 
"may both serve the intellectual content of the argument and be an aesthetic end in 
itself, demonstrating the cleverness of the critic" (p. 88). Literary criticism, then, 
must be quite literary itself in order to persuade the literati of its merit. The purist 
reading literary criticism independent of its intended context might find it lacking 
because "literary arguments often do not make explicit certain structurally predict-
able elements—the definitions, causal linkages, comparisons which derive from the 
stases and common topoi of classical rhetoric" (p. 84). Yet the special literary topoi of 
literary critics "invoke the shared assumptions of the community of literary scholars, 
and at the same time create that community" (p. 84). 
Stratman's analysis of legal brief writing (1990) suggests that a different commu-
nity of writers employs argumentative structure in quite a different way, supporting 
Toulmin's (1958) view that different situations bring out nuances in the particular 
argumentative strategy. Stratman maintains that "legal writing is a distinct, unique 
kind of writing skill [that] can be taught" (p. 196). Stratman's findings about the 
writing of legal briefs—a particular form of argument—run counter to the widely 
held view of law schools that general practice in critical reasoning will result in good 
legal writing. As a consequence of their belief that students can transfer general 
thinking skills to their writing, law schools rarely give explicit instruction in legal 
composing. 
Stratman (1990) finds this approach misguided, arguing that "What differentiates 
legal reasoning and argument from ordinary reasoning and argument are the unique 
rhetorical demands that structure the appellant-appellee (petitioner-respondent) 
relationships and the way courts may reconstitute opposing arguments in the context 
of this relationship" (p. 185). Appellate brief writers need to be able to make 
inferences about certain enduring dispositions common to both judges and their 
opposing lawyers, should be able to anticipate the ways in which judges and oppo-
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nents read through a brief, and should be able to simulate the ways in which judges 
and opponents interpret and integrate information from the brief. Thus, the task of 
successful legal brief writing requires specialized knowledge in audience characteris-
tics that shape the content and form of the product, a necessary element of legal 
training that Stratman has found almost absent in law school instruction. 
The studies on argumentation by Fahnestock and Secor (1991) and Stratman 
(1990) suggest the extraordinary complexity of successful writing and support the 
notion that particular tasks require not just general and task-specific declarative and 
procedural knowledge but also "knowledge that gives background and definition to 
[each discipline]—not only 'facts' but the terms of art, operational concepts, canons 
of relevance, patterns of association, characteristic argumentative gestures, and so 
on" (Colomb, 1988, p. 12). Those whose work seems to support the community-
specific knowledge position (i.e., Ackerman, 1991; Anson & Forsberg, 1990; Bazer-
man & Paradis, 1991; Berkenkotter, Huckin, & Ackerman, 1988; Carter, 1990; 
Clark & Doheny-Farina, 1990; Greene, in press; Herrington, 1985; Odell & Gos-
wami, 1985; Simons, 1989; Spivey, 1990; Witte, 1991,1992) might agree that certain 
general thinking skills are essential to many different tasks. The question they might 
pose is: Can they be taught independently with the expectation that learners can 
spontaneously apply them to novel situations? Or should they be taught in the context 
of a specific type of problem that the learner needs to solve, one that involves the 
application of those skills within particular constraints and with specific task- and 
community-related knowledge? 
Those who accept the community-specific knowledge position must also accept the 
necessity of conventional knowledge—that is, knowledge of the social or situational 
understandings that govern behavior under particular circumstances. According to 
this position, one may know generally how to drive and may know that general 
driving knowledge must be adjusted when one moves from a stick shift sports car to 
an automatic transmission recreational vehicle. Yet knowledge of how to drive also 
depends on knowledge of local customs: One operates a sports car one way on the 
Autobahn and another way on the Dan Ryan Expressway. Similarly, they would 
argue, one needs conventional knowledge when composing: the tone, sources of 
evidence, voice, and so on required to write for a practitioner-oriented journal are 
quite different from those needed to write for a research journal. 
Teachers who adopt the community-specific knowledge position are faced with a 
daunting instructional problem. They must either instruct students to differentiate 
their writing in seemingly unlimited ways or be content with having limited influence 
on student writing. Perkins and Salomon (1988) offer some hope for teachers. They 
speak of the need for mindful attention to transfer—that is, the conscious and 
deliberate application of knowledge in contexts other than the one originally studied. 
They contend that teachers who "persistently and systematically . . . saturate the 
context of education with attention to transfer" (p. 29) will improve the likelihood 
that students will reapply knowledge when they shift domains. This saturation must 
be an integral part of the class structure rather than a tag at the end of a lesson; 
Salomon (1987) has found that most students are decidedly unmindful unless specifi-
cally and vigorously cued. Teachers who adopt the community-specific knowledge 
position and who aspire to retain their optimism regarding the range of their 
influence, then, must work hard at fostering a sense of consistent mindfulness in their 
students in adapting knowledge to new situations. 
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Literary Understanding 
The Argument for General Knowledge 
As in composition, the view that reading, including reading literature, depends 
primarily on general knowledge still has much currency. Perkins and Salomon (1988), 
for instance, maintain that "surface characteristics of . . . new contexts strongly 
stimulate reading skills—text appears in front of one's eyes, so what else would one 
do but read it" (p. 27). To do so, readers apply what Irwin (1991) calls micro-
processes, such as the chunking of groups of words into meaningful phrases. The 
question is whether this general knowledge is sufficient to enable one to read with 
understanding in different circumstances. 
During the past 2 decades, radical changes in researchers' conceptions of reading 
have challenged the view that reading involves mastering a set of subskills that enable 
a reader to read any text. However, these new conceptions are also rooted in the 
belief in general knowledge, at least to some extent. In their recent review of reading 
research, Dole, Duffy, Roehler, and Pearson (1991) contend that the traditional view 
of reading "assumes a passive reader who has mastered a large number of subskills 
and automatically applies them to all texts" (p. 242). In contrast, they offer what they 
term the cognitive view, which "assumes an active reader who constructs meaning 
through the integration of existing and new knowledge and the flexible use of 
strategies to foster, monitor, regulate, and maintain comprehension" (p. 242). Dole 
et al. criticize traditional skill instruction for connoting consistency, if not rigidity, 
and suggest that the goal of instruction should be to help students gain conscious 
control over a set of strategies that they can adapt to any text that they read. They 
offer five such strategies: determining importance, summarizing information, draw-
ing inferences, generating questions, and monitoring comprehension. While these 
researchers emphasize that good readers adapt their strategies based on their pur-
pose, task and text demands, and situational context, they identify and name the 
strategies that ought to stand at the center of the reading curriculum, a practice that 
indicates their faith in the importance of general procedural knowledge. 
Even those researchers who begin with the belief that literary and nonliterary 
reading are qualitatively different experiences may display a belief in general knowl-
edge. For example, although Langer (1989, 1990) does not speak of skills and 
strategies, she does describe important similarities between literary and nonliterary 
reading. She found that, in both kinds of reading, readers employed four stances: 
being out and stepping into an envisionment (i.e., the growing and changing sense a 
reader makes of a text), being in and moving through an envisionment, stepping back 
and rethinking what one knows, and stepping out and objectifying the experience. 
She argues that "the similarities in the process involved in responding across the 
different text types indicate that the four stances represent a range of meaning-
making options that underlie developing understandings in general—regardless of 
text type" (1989, p. 20). 
The belief that "reading is reading" informs the approaches that many teachers 
take to instruct students in the study of literature. Scholes (1985) notes that pro-
fessors of literature believe that they are not teachers of reading. They believe that 
because students have been taught to read in lower grades they are ready to read 
literature (or at least to hear about literary readings). This assumption also informs 
the approach taken by many high school texts. The 1989 edition of Scott, Foresman's 
Patterns in Literature (Farrell, Clapp, & Kuehner, 1989) divides its objectives into six 
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major skills areas: application of literary terms, reading skills, vocabulary skills, 
thinking skills, speaking and listening skills, and writing skills and technique. Al-
though the list of literary terms covered in the book leads off their discussion of 
objectives, their presentation suggests the authors' confidence that skills and knowl-
edge are transferred readily from one type of text to another. They cite recognizing 
cause and effect relationships as one of the reading skills students will learn, implying 
that this skill is similar across text types. They explain that students will practice such 
thinking skills as classifying and generalizing, implying that this general skill is 
transferable across disciplines. And even their statement of the literary terms ad-
dressed in the text suggests that they do not see reading different literary genres as 
requiring specialized skills or strategies. They distinguish literary terms from reading 
skills, implying that, while reading literature may require some specialized knowl-
edge, it involves essentially the same processes as does any other kind of reading. 
One implication of the belief in general reading skills is that literature instruction 
should help students develop the procedural knowledge that they need to read any 
new text. However, the distinction between the study of reading and literature that 
Scholes (1985) contends characterizes university curricula, a distinction that is in 
large measure replicated in the secondary schools, suggests that this implication has, 
in large measure, been rejected. Instead, the belief in general knowledge manifests 
itself in the belief that students of literature already have in place the skills and 
strategies they need to have meaningful transactions with literature. Interestingly, 
this belief has a number of its own instructional implications, implications often 
radically at odds with one another. Teachers holding such a belief in general knowl-
edge might argue that, because students have the skills and strategies they need to 
read literature, teachers need only provide the occasion for exchange about the 
literature that the class reads together. Others might argue that it is a teacher's 
obligation to provide the knowledge that students undoubtedly do not have, knowl-
edge of technical vocabulary, say, or declarative knowledge about author and text. 
Although recent research by Many and Wiseman (1992) suggests that these ap-
proaches need not be incompatible, as we noted in our discussion of composition, the 
belief in general knowledge is shared by theorists and teachers who seem to share 
little else. 
Other researchers and theorists who have studied response to literature reject the 
idea that all reading is the same and seek instead to describe literary reading. 
However, while they may identify literary reading as a new domain, much of this 
research is marked by a belief in the applicability of general knowledge within that 
domain. For example, Rosenblatt (1938,1978), certainly the most influential theorist 
on research in response to literature, draws a distinction between efferent and 
aesthetic reading. According to Rosenblatt, readers who adopt an efferent stance are 
concerned primarily with what they will take away from the reading, a concern that 
manifests itself in treating the text as information. Readers who adopt an aesthetic 
stance, on the other hand, are concerned with what they are living through while they 
are reading a text. Rosenblatt maintains that, although any text can be read with 
either an efferent or aesthetic stance, literature offers unique possibilities for aes-
thetic transactions. In drawing this distinction, Rosenblatt moves away from the 
reading is reading view. However, she does not distinguish what readers must do to 
have aesthetic transactions with different literary genres, and thus she still places her 
faith in general procedural knowledge for responding to literature. 
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Hunt and Vipond's (1985,1992; Vipond & Hunt 1984) empirical investigations of 
literary reading, what they once called point-driven reading and now are calling 
dialogic reading, share this faith. Hunt and Vipond differ from Rosenblatt in that 
they posit three stances that distinguish dialogic from story-driven aesthetic readings. 
They characterize literary reading by identifying three types of strategies readers 
employ in such readings: coherence strategies, narrative surface strategies, and 
transactional strategies (Vipond & Hunt, 1984). For Vipond and Hunt, this general 
procedural knowledge is applicable in reading any literary text. 
Gevinson's (1990) study of four professors of English, thinking aloud as they read 
three stories, took a different tack to investigate literary understanding, but it shares 
the belief in general knowledge. Gevinson argues that literary understanding is a 
coherent concept, noting that despite differences in training, speciality, critical 
allegiance, age, and gender all of his readers seemed to share a conception of literary 
understanding very similar to the formalist theory of R. S. Crane. In a follow-up 
study (1991), he reanalyzed the protocols of his readers in an attempt to define 
expertise in reading literature. He identified five dimensions of expert behavior: 
stance; sense of the whole to be understood; declarative knowledge base; procedural 
knowledge base; and attitudes, habits and beliefs. He suggested that recognizing 
these dimensions of general literary knowledge can provide direction for curriculum 
planners. 
Although a growing body of research makes the case for general knowledge by 
seeking to characterize literary reading, this research and theory has had less impact 
on curricula than did the broader general knowledge position that reading is essen-
tially the same regardless of what is being read. Indeed, while some researchers are 
calling for more attention to the instructional implications of general literary knowl-
edge (Probst, 1991; Squire, 1989), others are investigating the difficulties of bringing 
this research and theory into practice (Klages, 1992). 
The Argument for Task-Specific Knowledge 
No researcher or theorist would reject the idea that reading any text requires the 
application of a number of similar processes. However, some researchers and theor-
ists emphasize the unique demands of certain kinds of literary texts. So, while they 
might accept Pressley, Goodchild, Fleet, Zajchowski, and Evans's (1989) argument 
on the importance of across-domain strategies, they place greater emphasis on what 
Pressley et al. would call task-limited strategies. That is, they argue that different 
kinds of literature invite readers to read in different ways. 
Culler (1975), for example, argues that "texts have meanings for those who know 
how to read them—those who in their encounters with literature have assembled the 
conventions that are constitutive of literature as an institution and a means of 
communication" (p. 50). He argues further that "The task of literary theory or 
poetics, then, is to make explicit the procedures and conventions of reading, to offer a 
comprehensive theory of the ways in which we go about making sense of various 
kinds of texts" (1981, p. 125). That is, different kinds of literary texts place different 
demands on readers; to read these texts, then, readers must invoke the strategies and 
conventions appropriate to them. 
Rabinowitz (1987) explores this argument in great depth. He explains that reading 
literature "is not even a logical consequence of knowledge of the linguistic system and 
its written signs. It is, rather, a separately learned, conventional activity" (p. 27). 
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Rabinowitz argues that, in order to engage in an authorial reading, readers must have 
an understanding of appropriate literary conventions in place before they begin to 
read. He summarizes his view of reading by offering the metaphor of text as 
unassembled swing set. The mechanism is 
a concrete thing, that when completed, offers opportunities for free play, but you 
have to assemble it first. It comes with rudimentary directions, but you have to know 
what the directions are, as well as how to perform basic tasks. It comes with its own 
materials, but you must have certain tools of your own at hand. Most important, the 
instructions are virtually meaningless unless you know beforehand what sort of 
object you are aiming at. (p. 38) 
As his metaphor makes clear, according to Rabinowitz (1987), the genre of the text 
determines the nature of the instructions it offers and the conventions, strategies, or 
interpretive operations it requires to read it. 
Rabinowitz (1987) does not claim that authorial reading is the only or even the best 
way to read. He does, however, argue that it is the sort of reading that most people 
(including academics) do and, more importantly, that it provides the basis for other 
sorts of reading, especially the kind of political reading that can make literature a 
source for social transformation. And, while he recognizes that the invitations that 
authors offer for conventional reading are socially constituted, he argues that, once 
readers have accepted an author's invitation, they discover meaning rather than 
create it. 
Although little research has been conducted to evaluate particular approaches to 
teaching literature, several studies have investigated the effects of helping students 
develop task-specific knowledge. Smith (1989) found that giving students direct 
instruction in the interpretive strategies that Booth (1974) claims experienced 
readers use to understand irony significantly improved students' ability to under-
stand ironic poetry, as measured by performance on an objective test and by re-
sponses to interview questions. In essence, Booth argues that authors alert readers to 
the presence of irony through five types of clues and that, once alerted, readers 
employ particular strategies to reconstruct ironic meanings. In Smith's study, stu-
dents were taught the clues and strategies through the use of songs, short poems, and 
excerpts of poems before applying them independently to longer and more difficult 
poems. In addition to increasing students' understanding of ironic poetry, Hillocks 
(1989) found that such an approach resulted in substantially higher levels of engage-
ment in classroom discussions than did a more traditional approach to teaching 
poetry. Further, Smith (1991, in press) has found that giving students direct instruc-
tion in the conventions experienced readers employ to understand unreliable narra-
tors may help students become more active interpreters of meaning. 
According to these theorists and researchers, having general knowledge does not 
guarantee that one can experience a meaningful transaction with a literary text. They 
therefore see the job of teachers of literature as determining what kinds of literature 
students need to know how to read, identifying strategies necessary for reading them, 
and designing instruction to teach the strategies. This position assumes that students 
will employ these strategies whenever the need arises, that once they have been 
taught strategies for, say, interpreting irony they will recognize and interpret irony in 
their subsequent independent reading. 
Although the theorists and researchers who emphasize the importance of task-
specific knowledge believe that helping students develop that knowledge is a way to 
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increase students' textual power, critics could object that such instruction in fact 
places unjustified limits on students' interpretations. In the first place, a belief in the 
existence of generalizable interpretive operations, even in particular domains, would 
result in instruction that would emphasize the conventional at the expense of the 
idiosyncratic. In the second place, instruction based on an analysis of the demands of 
particular kinds of texts necessarily places texts into genres. Teachers who use texts to 
teach strategies, then, preempt students from making their own judgments about the 
nature of the texts that they read. Perhaps most significantly, critics of this position 
might echo the concern of those who argue against emphasizing task-specific knowl-
edge in composition instruction (i.e., Atwell, 1987) that: in planning instruction, 
teachers would necessarily privilege certain genres. Critics might contend that in-
struction would be based on what the teacher thinks is important rather than on what 
the students regard as important. 
The Argument for Community-Specific Knowledge 
Like those composition theorists and researchers who argue for the importance of 
task-specific knowledge, the theorists and researchers cited in the previous section 
argue that the form of the text places particular demands on its readers. Other 
theorists, most notably Stanley Fish, reject this argument. Unlike Rabinowitz (1987), 
who sees the formal features of texts as cuing the kind of reading necessary to do an 
authorially relevant interpretation, Fish (1980) believes that decisions about how to 
read are solely a function of the interpretive framework that the reader brings to the 
text: 
Indeed, it is interpretive communities, rather than either the text or the reader, that 
produce meanings and are responsible for the emergence of formal features. Inter-
pretive communities are made up of those who share interpretive strategies, not for 
reading but for writing texts, for constituting their properties. In other words these 
strategies exist prior to the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is 
read rather than, as is usually assumed, the other way around, (p. 14) 
Fish's critique of Booth's (1974) A Rhetoric of Irony is instructive in elucidating his 
position. Whereas Booth argues that readers of irony are cued by the text to employ 
certain strategies, Fish (1983) claims that irony resides not in texts but rather in 
readers: 
Irony, then, is neither the property of works, nor the creation of an unfettered 
imagination, but a way of reading, an interpretive strategy that produces the object of 
its attention, an object that is perspicuous to those who share or have been persuaded 
to share the same strategy, (p. 189) 
That is, the clues are not in the text. Rather, the reader approaches the text having 
been persuaded to identify certain textual features as clues. 
Fish's literary theory (1983) could find support in research on perspective taking in 
reading. This research (Anderson & Pichert, 1978; Walczyk & Hall, 1991) suggests 
that the perspective of the reader strongly influences what will be recalled from a 
story. For instance, Anderson and Pichert found that readers playing the role of a 
burglar were more likely to recall the kind and location of valuables in a house while 
those playing the role of prospective home buyers were more likely to recall that the 
house had spacious grounds. As Anderson and Pearson (1984) establish in their 
review of reading research, additional studies suggest that the perspective of the 
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reader also affects the allocation of readers' attention. Fish's (1983) theory could also 
find support in studies of response to literature that identify distinct orientations that 
characterize individual reader's approaches to literature. The work of de Beau-
grande (1985) and Dias (1987), for example, suggests that readers approach texts 
with a particular orientation already in place and that their orientation determines in 
large measure how they choose to read. 
According to Fish (1980), the fundamental instructional implication of his theory is 
that teaching moves from the demonstration of interpretations "by facts that are 
independently specified" (p. 365) to persuasion that the presuppositions that have 
given rise to the facts are useful and valuable. Research suggests that teachers are 
indeed persuasive, with Applebee (1977) and Purves, Foshay, and Hansson (1973) 
finding that instruction has pronounced effects on the nature of students' response to 
literature. 
Bleich (1978) suggests another approach consistent with Fish's (1980) view. He 
argues that, if students make texts of their responses by writing response statements, 
classes can use these texts to understand the impact of membership in various 
communities. Bleich contends that "to know anything at all is to have assigned a part 
of one's self to a group of others who claim to know the same thing" (1978, p. 296) 
and that the study of response statements allows classes "to identify the variety of 
viewpoints and pre-existing community memberships of both students and teachers" 
(1988, p. 318). For example, in Readings and Feelings (1975), Bleich analyzes 
responses of college freshmen to Vanity Fair to point out a common preoccupation 
with sex and marriage while, in The Double Perspective (1988), he provides several 
instances of responses that are affected by the gender of the reader. 
Appleman (in press) offers another way that teachers can clarify the impact of 
community membership on interpretation. She calls for teaching students how to 
look through different critical lenses. She explains the results of teaching upper level, 
high school students to look at literature from four perspectives: reader-response, 
structuralist, Marxist, and feminist. Students' comments on how the course changed 
their reading are in line with Fish's (1980) argument. One wrote: "These literary 
theories, or critical lenses, will like change the meaning of the text to the reader" 
(Appleman, in press). Another wrote: "A book is not just black ink on paper—it's 
creation, feelings and images that you as the reader, reading through the lenses of 
Marxism, feminism, structuralism, and reader-response as well as others I don't 
know yet, make them out to be" (Appleman, in press). This student went on to 
suggest that the course be renamed "Through the Eyes of the Beholder." 
Fish's (1980) notion of interpretive communities suggests that instruction should 
be centered on exploring the consequences of people's choosing to read in certain 
ways rather than on recognizing and accepting the invitation to read in conventional 
ways. Fish's own work, as well as the work of Bleich (1978,1988) and Appleman (in 
press), suggests that teachers could make this exploration in several ways: by articu-
lating the assumptions that guide their own reading, by helping students identify the 
communities to which they belong, and by helping students experience the impact 
that membership in different communities has on their reading. Critics (i.e., Booth, 
1983) of this kind of instruction would argue that Fish's theory has unfortunate ethical 
consequences, for, by privileging the creative activity of the reader, it underestimates 
the benefits that attending to great imaginative works provides. 
As in the case of composition, belief in community-specific knowledge forces 
teachers to recognize the limits of the consequences of their instruction. Teachers of 
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literature who take this position believe that they are teaching a way to read literature 
rather than the way to read literature. They also are participating in a long-standing 
and often rancorous debate on the nature of meaning and where it resides, a 
complete accounting of which extends far beyond the scope of this essay. 
Conclusion 
The debates about the specificity of knowledge that are raging in educational 
psychology raise issues that lie below the surface of discussions about how to investi-
gate and teach composition and literary understanding. However, while the various 
antagonists in educational psychology have explicated their positions, these issues 
typically are unarticulated in discussions of literacy. Our primary purpose in identi-
fying three positions regarding the specificity of knowledge—the case for general 
knowledge, the case for task-specific knowledge, and the case for community-specific 
knowledge—is to give voice to this silent debate. We believe that both researchers 
and teachers of literacy will benefit from articulating the principles that provide the 
underpinnings of their work. 
We have found, in fact, that the distinctions have value as a heuristic. Our work on 
this review has caused us to reconsider our own teaching, especially our teaching in 
secondary schools. As our citations of our own work suggest, we have focused in our 
research and publications on how to develop task-specific knowledge, a focus that 
also dominated our high school teaching. Our students might have been better served 
had we considered more carefully the general and community-specific knowledge 
that they needed in addition to the task-specific knowledge we helped them develop. 
But like many teachers, although we did not declare allegiance to one of the positions 
in principle, we did so in practice. And the demands of our high schools' already 
crowded curricula gave us little reason or opportunity to think about what more we 
could do. 
This is not to say that we believe the distinctions are absolute. In fact, we agree with 
those who have argued that drawing dichotomies (or trichotomies) serves rhetorical 
rather than theoretical and practical purposes and therefore have striven to take a 
conciliatory view in the dispute about the nature of knowledge in learning. Perkins 
and Salomon (1989) assert that "there are general cognitive skills; but they always 
function in contextualized ways" (p. 19). They caution against taking a winner-take-
all stance in such disputes and argue in favor of a search for theoretical compatibility. 
Some researchers involved in basic (as opposed to instructional) research on reading 
and writing processes (i.e., Flower, 1987; Flower & Hayes, 1980,1981,1984; Hayes & 
Flower, 1980) have constructed models that include general processes, such as setting 
goals and drawing on prior knowledge. They view these processes, however, as 
subject to external factors, such as the task environment and the social context of 
learning. These environmental factors mediate if, when, and how a process is 
instantiated in reading or writing, leading the researchers ultimately to take a 
sociocognitive view of literacy (Flower, 1992). 
However, though the positions may be compatible, we believe that the distinctions 
we have made are especially crucial for planners of curricula. Although basic re-
search has examined general processes at all levels of age, schooling, and expertise, 
instructional research on the three positions suggests a auricular path (i.e., see, 
Carter, 1990). The general knowledge position is most widely substantiated at the 
elementary level, the task-specific position is best supported at the secondary and 
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collegiate levels, and the community-specific position is most typically investigated at 
the upper levels of schooling and in the professions. And this makes sense. A base of 
general knowledge is necessary for learners to engage in specific writing and reading 
tasks. Both general and task-specific knowledge are likely to be prerequisite for 
membership in specialized discourse communities. We call this a curricular path, 
rather than a developmental one, because we see the acquisition of increasingly 
specialized knowledge as a function of instruction (whether formal or informal) 
rather than of age. 
Our review, therefore, provides something of a paradox. It articulates distinctions 
among the positions taken by researchers, theorists, and teachers. But instead of 
resulting in more disputes, identifying these distinctions may help resolve arguments, 
at least as they are played out in the planning of curricula. Indeed, we believe that 
curricula and instruction that neglect any of the three types of knowledge we have 
identified neglect students as well. 
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